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Thompson: Solving Corporate Inversion Phenomenon

COMMENT

Solving the Corporate Inversion
Phenomenon: An Exercise in Free
Market Patriotism, Protectionism
Through Facilitation
By Brian Thompson*

ABSTRACT
The United States government grapples with the right solution to deter corporations from inverting abroad. A corporation’s decision to invert is made
in the interest of its shareholders, including many who are United States
citizens. However, many have called inverting corporations unpatriotic,
traders, and cheaters. These labels shift the blame to an easy scapegoat. In
order to quell this recent phenomenon, the United States government must
move beyond rhetoric and reevaluate the cause of the exodus. Politicians
have no one to blame but themselves and the outdated corporate policy
they have left in place. Heavy-handed government policies to punish corporations for doing what is best for their shareholders is not only counterproductive but also contrary to corporate duties imposed by existing law.
The government must move in the opposite direction. The government
must disregard punitive policies and reform the law to facilitate a competitive corporate market. The answer to global corporate competitiveness is
less government interference. The only way to protect the United States’
corporate base is for the government to facilitate a corporate friendly environment otherwise the corporate evacuation will persist.
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INTRODUCTION

For the free market to perform as intended, lawmakers customarily allow the
merger of United States corporations into foreign entities, a process known as a
corporate or tax inversion. However, this right is not absolute. According to former
U.S. Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, “these activities [inversions] should be based
on economic efficiency, not tax savings.”1 A 2014 Congressional Research Service
report “estimated that 47 companies had undertaken inversions in the past decade,”2
including 12 companies that have inverted since 2011.3
The above statistics have not been ignored, and as the rate of inversions has
increased, so has public scrutiny. A poll conducted nationwide among registered
voters found that 59% believed that Congress should act to “penalize and discourage companies” from inverting.4 Even former President Barack Obama declared
that corporate inversions are an exercise in “gaming the system.” 5
This type of rhetoric directed at “evil corporations” is an easy way to score
political points, but it begs the question: what drives businesses to engage in inversions? As Judge Learned Hand said in 1934, “any one may so arrange his affairs
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s
taxes.”6 Corporate directors and managers have a fiduciary duty to create as much
wealth as possible for their shareholders.7 U.S. corporations are accomplishing that
legal obligation by moving to a foreign jurisdiction, usually one that offers a much
lower tax rate.8 Any government action aimed at preventing inversions runs contrary to free market principles, but more importantly, would result in a mandate for
corporate directors to violate their fiduciary obligations by preventing a practice
meant to generate more wealth for the company’s shareholders.
Part two of this article will provide a definition of corporate inversions and
explain the various ways companies structure these transactions. Part three
* Brian Thompson is a research assistant, lecturer, and PhD candidate at the University of Bonn
Institute of Private International and Comparative Law in Bonn, Germany. Mr. Thompson is writing his
doctoral dissertation on the resolution of cross-border derivatives disputes. Mr. Thompson is also a licensed attorney and alumnus of the University of Missouri School of Law.
1. Jacob J. Lew, Close the Tax Loophole on Inversions, WASH. POST (July 27, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-close-the-tax-loophole-on-inversions/2014/07/27/2ea50966-141d-11e4-98eedaea85133bc9_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.5346b4453b39. Lew points out that recent inversions
have not only been motivated by tax savings, but also “expressly justified by” tax considerations. Id.
2. Shane Zahrt, Note, Ending Corporate Inversions: Past Failures, Continued Controversy, and Proposals for Reform, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1591, 1595 (2015).
3. Kathy Wong, Note, Inverse Logic: The Shortcomings of Preventing Corporate Tax Inversions
Through Amending Section 7874, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 451, 452 (2016).
4. John D. McKinnon, Strong Support for Congressional Action on Inversions – WSJ/NBC Poll,
WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Sept. 9, 2014, 6:36 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/09/strongsupport-for-congressional-action-on-inversions-wsjnbc-poll/.
5. Kevin McCoy, Obama Steps Up Criticism of Tax Inversions, USA TODAY (July 24, 2014, 7:18
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/24/obama-tax-inversions-criticism/13120369/.
6. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934).
7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders . . . the powers of directors are to be employed
for that end”).
8. Melissa Lucar, Corporate Inversions: The Fleeing Notion of an American Corporation, 15 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 265, 268 (2015).
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investigates the root causes of the corporate inversion phenomenon. Part four details
the specific policies that the U.S. government has enacted in an attempt to limit
inversions. Finally, part five consists of proposals designed to limit the incentive to
invert rather than placing a barrier between directors and fiduciary compliance.

II.

CORPORATE INVERSIONS
A. Corporate Inversion Defined

A now frequent and increasingly criticized phenomenon, corporate inversion
is most simply defined as the reorganization of a U.S. corporation into a foreign
entity.9 The U.S. Department of the Treasury provides that a corporate inversion
occurs when “a U.S. based multinational restructures so that the U.S. parent is replaced by a foreign corporation, in order to avoid U.S. taxes.”10 This practice has
been labeled an “inversion” because the acquiring company eliminates its own corporate identity in order to preserve the target company’s identity—the opposite of
the standard merger and acquisition transaction.11
An inversion does not involve the physical relocation of the corporation; the
transaction is more symbolic because the substantial change is reflected only in the
business agreement.12 Generally, there is not any change in the corporation’s internal operations.13 After a U.S. corporation has inverted, its management and business
operations usually remain in the U.S.14 The company is merely renouncing its U.S.
citizenship so its economic activity is not disrupted.15

B. Approaches to Structuring a Corporate Inversion
There are three principal methods a U.S. corporation can use to structure its
inversion: “(1) meeting the substantial activit[ies] test; (2) merging with a smaller
foreign company; or (3) [being acquired by] a larger foreign company.”16 The second and third methods that require a merger can be achieved through a stock, asset,
or drop-down transaction.17
First, the substantial activities test is an exception to § 7874 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Under § 7874, a corporation is classified as “domestic,” and can
thereby be taxed at the domestic rate, if the U.S. corporation owns 80% or more of
a foreign corporation after the inversion.18 The substantial business activity
9. Gregory Day, Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV. 453, 454
(2016).
10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces First Steps to Reduce Tax Benefits
of Corporate Inversions (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2647.aspx.
11. Day, supra note 9, at 454-55.
12. Lucar, supra note 8, at 267-68.
13. James Mann, Note, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of a Larger Problem, The Corporate Income Tax, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 524 (2005).
14. Lucar, supra note 8, at 268.
15. Wong, supra note 3, at 453.
16. Michael B. Cohen, Note and Comment, Avoiding Double Taxation and Expatriation: A Comprehensive Solution to FATCA and Corporate Inversion, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 595, 638 (2016).
17. Lucar, supra note 8, at 279.
18. Id. at 277-78.
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exemption permits a company to invert “if it has substantial business activity in the
country of reincorporation.”19
Second, in an inversion where a smaller foreign corporation is acquired by a
larger U.S. corporation, the merger is conducted to make the newly merged corporation subject to the foreign jurisdiction’s tax rate.20 After the merger is complete,
the U.S. corporation becomes the majority owner of the foreign corporation, giving
the U.S. based management team control of the foreign corporation.21
The third method of inversion occurs when a smaller U.S. corporation merges
with a larger foreign corporation. The U.S. corporation may be legitimately attempting to enhance foreign operations, irrespective of the possible tax benefits, when an
entity chooses this transactional approach.22 The result of this merger is that the
U.S. corporation assumes a minority ownership percentage in the merged company.23 This approach is distinct and more than symbolic because management is
moved to the foreign parent’s headquarters. 24
As stated above, the inversions that can be achieved through a merger are completed by employing one of the following techniques: a stock, asset, or a drop-down
transaction.25 A stock transaction is achieved when the shareholders of the U.S.
corporation trade all their shares for equity in the foreign corporation.26 The outcome of this transaction is that the foreign parent assumes ownership of the U.S.
corporation and the now former shareholders of the U.S. corporation become majority owners in the existing foreign company.27 Practically speaking, all this transaction does is convert ownership.28 Normally, the foreign parent incorporates in a
jurisdiction with low corporate rates as a holding company, 29 while “the U.S. corporation either becomes a subsidiary or transfers all its assets to the foreign parent.”30
Asset transfers are typically employed in smaller-scale inversions. 31 An asset
transaction can be structured in two different ways. 32 The first approach employs
the use of a continuation transaction to transform the U.S. parent corporation into
the foreign parent by automatically merging the U.S. corporation’s shares into
shares of the foreign corporation.33 The second approach is when every asset and
liability of the U.S. corporation is transferred to a foreign corporation in exchange

19. Id. at 278.
20. Id. at 279.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 278.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Scott DeAngelis, Note, If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them: The U.S. Solution to the Issue of
Corporate Inversions, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1359 (2015).
26. Joseph A. Tootle, Note, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activities”, 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 363 (2013).
27. Id.
28. Eloine Kim, Note, Corporate Inversion: Will the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 Reduce the
Incentive to Re-Incorporate?, 4 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 152, 161 (2005).
29. Tootle, supra note 26, at 363.
30. Kim, supra note 28, at 161.
31. Lucar, supra note 8, at 280.
32. Joshua Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inversions and Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule,
68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 673, 678 (2013).
33. Id.
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for stock that the U.S. corporation liquidates in order to convey the surplus value to
its shareholders.34
A drop-down transaction or combined inversion,35 utilizes elements of both the
former techniques.36 When a corporation uses a drop-down structure in exchange
for stock, the U.S. corporation transfers its assets to the new foreign parent.37 In
order to complete the transaction, the foreign parent transfers some of its recently
acquired assets back to a domestic subsidiary.38 Following the completion of that
transaction, the original U.S. corporation is defunct, but its former shareholders hold
the same amount of equity in the new foreign corporation as they once held in the
defunct corporation.39

III.

CAUSES OF THE CORPORATE INVERSION PHENOMENON

The U.S. has always been a target for corporate domicile, given its propensity
to provide corporate safeguards in addition to the obvious size of its consumer
base.40 These alluring attributes enabled the U.S. government to maintain a higher
corporate tax rate without risking capital flight. 41 However, the current tax structure
is outdated, which creates an issue for U.S. multinational corporations because of
the anti-competitive corporate tax rate relative to others competing in the international arena.42
The National Foreign Trade Council conducted a study in 2002 examining U.S.
international tax policy and found that the U.S. is an undesirable location for a multinational corporation’s legal domicile.43 The report concluded that, “a significant
modernization of the U.S. rules is necessary to restore competitive balance in the
vastly changed circumstances of the global economy of the 21st century.” 44 Corporation inversions are the product of the dated U.S. tax rules in an increasingly competitive global economy.45 This leaves U.S. corporations at a disadvantage and is
consequently a key factor in influencing a company’s decision to invert, thereby
diminishing the burden imposed by the U.S. tax structure.46

34. Id.
35. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1360.
36. Lucar, supra note 8, at 280.
37. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1360.
38. Id.
39. Heather Campbell, Note, When Good Tax Law Goes Bad: Stanley Works’ Recent Dilemma and
How the Internal Revenue Code Disadvantages U.S. Multinational Corporations Forcing their Flight to
Foreign Jurisdictions, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 95, 104 (2004).
40. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1361.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP & Washington Council Ernst & Young, Territorial
Tax Study Report, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 11, 2002), http://www.nftc.org/default/Tax%20Policy/06_13_02_Territorial_Tax_Study_Report.pdf.pdf.
44. Kim, supra note 28, at 155.
45. Id. at 154.
46. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1361.
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A. Territorial Taxation Versus Worldwide Taxation
In a territorial system, income is taxed by the nation where the income originated.47 Under this system, offshore income is exempt from domestic tax collectors.48 Most foreign countries only tax domestic-sourced income, which includes
25% of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.49 Except for the U.S., all six co-members of the G-7, a group of the seven
largest economies in the world, use some form of a territorial tax system. 50 Many
countries have implemented provisions into their territorial system designed to stop
companies from removing earned income to foreign jurisdictions, bypassing any
potential domestic tax liability.51
Conversely, the U.S. employs a worldwide taxation system.52 Under a worldwide tax scheme, the country where a corporation is domiciled, taxes all income
regardless of whether it is earned domestically or abroad.53 Under the U.S. tax structure, a levy on foreign corporations is imposed only on income-connected U.S. business operations, an advantage that is unavailable to domestic corporations.54 In an
attempt by the U.S. government to narrow this competitive gap, domestic corporations may claim a foreign tax credit on taxes paid to foreign countries if the income
originates therein.55 The foundation of the foreign tax credit system is formulated
by grouping a corporation’s income into specific and distinct classifications. 56 Following this classification, the foreign tax credit is calculated by combining general
and passive income.57 The foreign tax credit only applies to compulsory taxes (required taxes in foreign jurisdictions), therefore, voluntary taxes can incur double
tax liability, as they do not qualify for the tax credit.58
The U.S. applies a “place-of-incorporation rule” for defining a corporation as
domestic or foreign.59 A corporation is domestic if it is organized under the laws of
any state.60 Conversely, if the corporation is organized under a foreign jurisdiction’s
laws, it is considered a foreign person under U.S. law.61 The foreign person distinction applies to any foreign subsidiary of a U.S. multinational.62 As a result, until
foreign subsidiaries’ earnings are repatriated back to the U.S. parent, there is no
domestic tax liability on the parent’s subsidiaries’ foreign-earned income. 63 Once
47. Chris Capurso, Note, Burgers, Doughnuts, and Expatriations: An Analysis of the Tax Inversion
Epidemic and a Solution Presented Through the Lens of the Burger King Tim Hortons Merger, 7 WM.
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 579, 584 (2016).
48. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1357.
49. James G.S. Yang, Corporate Inversions: Rules and Strategies, 27 J. INT’L TAX’N 37, 37 (2016).
50. Capurso, supra note 47, at 584.
51. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1357.
52. Capurso, supra note 47, at 584.
53. Id.
54. Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475,
485-86 (2005).
55. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1599.
56. Cohen, supra note 16, at 632.
57. Id. (noting that general income is referring to “namely, active income”).
58. Id.
59. Kirsch, supra note 54, at 485.
60. Id.
61. Tootle, supra note 26, at 358.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the foreign-earned income is repatriated to the U.S. parent, it is taxed at the U.S.
domestic rate.64 Domestic corporations are incentivized to defer potential domestic
tax liability by leaving foreign income abroad and out of reach of the worldwide tax
system.65

B. U.S. Corporate Tax Rates
During the 1980s, the U.S. corporate tax rate was relatively low among OECD
countries.66 At the same time, multinational corporations were incorporating in the
U.S. to gain access to its large consumer market and corporate legal protections.67
Then the competition caught up from 1979 to 2002, and the average corporate tax
rate fell from 43% to 29% among OECD countries.68 While this period of tax reformation was occurring abroad, the U.S. lost its competitive advantage by failing to
modify its corporate tax rate.69 President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory
Board warned that, “the growing gap between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the
corporate tax rates of most other countries generates incentives for U.S. corporations to shift their income and operations to foreign locations with lower corporate
tax rates to avoid U.S. taxes.” 70
The U.S. tax code received its last major reform in 1986.71 This government
complacency has left the U.S. corporate tax rate (currently 35%) as the highest in
the developed world.72 Accounting for state income tax, U.S. corporations could
face a 39.1% tax rate.73 The anti-competitiveness of the U.S. corporate tax rate is
one of the primary sources associated with inversions. 74 Global variances in tax
rates have consequences, namely, that it provides great incentives to transfer income
to low-rate jurisdictions.75 An unintended consequence of such a high tax rate is
that it reduces the profits of U.S. corporations, exposing domestic entities to a foreign takeover.76
Another revelation that has hurt U.S. corporations is the reality that the U.S.
government’s global competitors have been systematically reducing their corporate
tax rates.77 The U.S. tax rate is not only higher than that of any other OECD country,
it is also “higher than the 30[%] average among developing nations.” 78 A study by
a University of Calgary economists found that the U.S. federal and state tax rate on

64. Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 814 (2015).
65. Id.
66. David M. Towarnicky, Stop Calling Inverted Companies “Unpatriotic:” It is Congress’s Patriotic
Duty to Provide a Competitive Corporate Environment, 45 PUB. CONT. L. J. 163, 165 (2015).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. President’s Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd., The Report on Tax Reform Options: Simplification,
Compliance, and Corporate Taxation, PROCON.ORG i, 69 (Aug. 2010), http://corporatetax.procon.org/sourcefiles/PERAB-tax-reform-report.pdf.
71. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1596.
72. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 165 (emphasis added).
73. Yang, supra note 49, at 38.
74. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1598.
75. Yang, supra note 49, at 38.
76. Id.
77. Kim, supra note 28, at 156.
78. Id. at 157.
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new capital investment, considering credits and deductions, was an uncompetitive
35% compared to a 19.5% OECD average and an 18% global average. 79

C. Increased Regulatory Burden
Corporate inversions also allow companies to avoid the “thicket of complicated
rules” that the U.S. regulatory environment imposes. 80 A 2007 study found that the
regulatory costs of being a public company headquartered in the U.S. caused 16%
of such companies to consider a sale and 14% to consider a merger. 81 In addition,
the annual costs of regulatory compliance for firms incorporated in the U.S. is $1.75
trillion.82 This marked an overall increase of 171% from 2001 to 2006 for firms
with revenue under $1 billion, while firms with revenue over $1 billion experienced
a 12% increase in compliance costs from 2005 to 2006.83 The U.S. approach to
regulation relies on rules and compliance as opposed to a principles-based approach.84
The U.S. regulatory system involves regulators at both the federal and state
level, which is more complicated than countries with a single regulator, such as the
United Kingdom (“U.K.”).85 Federal and state regulators are mandated by law to
enforce their own regulations. As a result, it can take months to harmonize federal
and state laws because the regulatory system has not been streamlined. As long as
the U.S. regulatory system continues to be void of an overarching principle that
instructs regulators on the approach to take toward supervision and enforcement,
this inefficiency will continue to persist.86 Consequently, regulators are left with
only one option: to promulgate regulations under the statutory authority delegated
by outdated legislative mandates.87 These mandates have fallen behind the trends in
today’s global economy because they are not subject to substantial review. 88 This
archaic regulatory framework has forced corporate executives to spend more time
learning the purpose of each regulation and how it may impact their business.89 This
lack of understanding has facilitated an uneasy view toward any new regulations
that could drive up the cost of compliance even further.90
The overarching legal market in which the regulatory environment operates
strengthens its effectiveness. A legal market based on principles of fairness and
79. The Send Jobs Overseas Act: Ending the Deferral of Foreign Income is Another Tax on U.S. Employment,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
28,
2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703384204575509700366289206.
80. Simpson, supra note 32, at 688.
81. Foley & Lardner LLP, Foley Study Reveals Continued High Cost of Being Public, FOLEY (Aug.
2, 2007), https://www.foley.com/foley-study-reveals-continued-high-cost-of-being-public-08-02-2007/.
82. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, SMALL BUS.
ADMIN. i, iv (Sept. 2010), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regulatory%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full).pdf.
83. Foley, supra note 81.
84. Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, NYC.GOV i, 82 (Jan. 2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.
85. Simpson, supra note 32, at 693.
86. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 84, at 83.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (noting that the cost of compliance in the securities industry increased $12 billion from 2002
to 2005).
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predictability is the second most important standard in determining the competitiveness of a financial center.91 The legal system in the U.S. may be deteriorating its
established reputation as an epicenter for ingenuity. 92 By simply shifting their listings to overseas exchanges, corporations can avoid exposure to meritless securities
lawsuits and subsequent settlements that increase the operating costs for U.S. businesses.93 The previous years have produced new highs in both the quantity and value
of class action settlements in the security industry.94 Furthermore, due to federalism
in the U.S., sanctions are seen as arbitrary since state and federal courts provide
independent directives and outcomes depending on if the suit is brought by regulators, government attorneys general, class actions, or individuals. 95 This regulatory
volatility imposes even further costs on U.S. entities. 96

D. Corporate Debt: Interest Expense Deduction
The U.S. treatment of interest expenses has provided another incentive for U.S.
corporations to invert.97 Generally, interest payments on corporate borrowing can
be incurred anywhere in the corporate group, irrespective of where the corresponding benefit occurs.98 Accordingly, a domestic parent can obtain a loan, use such
funds to capitalize “foreign-source income-producing activities, and claim [an] interest deduction” in the domestic parent’s country of incorporation for offshore income.99 This interest deduction decreases the corporation’s domestic tax liability,
while allowing the corporation to use funds freed by the deduction to grow operations outside the country of incorporation.100
In the U.S., however, it is difficult to take advantage of this interest deduction.
Since it is difficult to apportion interest expenses, the Internal Revenue Code distributes the expense “across the corporate group on a pro rata basis [based on each
entity’s] total assets.”101 This method of allocation is costly for multinationals that
disproportionately borrow from U.S. lenders, which results in entities minimizing
and effectively avoiding these costs by reincorporating overseas.102

E. Income Shifting: Earnings Stripping
The majority of tax benefits that corporations are able to receive from inversions are the product of post-inversion techniques, such as income shifting.103 Income shifting is a technique that multinational corporations utilize to report income
earned from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that offers a more advantageous
91. Simpson, supra note 32, at 694.
92. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 84, at 71.
93. Id. at ii (noting that this is an increase in both actual and apparent operating costs).
94. Simpson, supra note 32, at 694.
95. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 84, at 17.
96. Simpson, supra note 32, at 694.
97. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, VI. Drawing Lines Around Corporate Inversion, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2270, 2277 (2005) [hereinafter Harv. Ass’n].
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2278.
103. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1362.
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corporate tax rate.104 The income is transferred through inter-company payments in
various forms of interest payments, “management fees, licensing fees, or royalties.”105 An accounting study found that “despite managements’ claims that inversion-related tax savings will be due to the avoidance of U.S. tax on foreign earnings
. . . most of the tax savings is attributable to the avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S.
earnings [through earnings stripping].”106
Earnings stripping is a common income shifting technique.107 Earnings stripping occurs when a corporation pays excessive interest amounts to related thirdparties as a way to reduce its taxable income.108 In an earnings stripping transaction,
a foreign parent corporation lends money to its U.S. subsidiary. 109 Following the
loan, the subsidiary can deduct from its taxable income the subsequent interest payments made to the foreign parent as a business expense, thereby reducing its domestic tax liability.110 Similarly, the U.S. corporation could make tax-deductible
royalty, management, or administrative expense payments to the foreign parent. 111
As previously discussed, the U.S. worldwide tax structure levies tax on foreign
corporations only on domestically generated income.112 Consequently, the outcome
of the earnings stripping transaction is the shifting of the subsidiary’s U.S. generated income out of the U.S., in the form of interest payments, to the newly formed
foreign parent.113 The benefit of an earnings stripping transaction is immediately
apparent to the corporation because any previous U.S. source taxable income is
modified to a U.S. source expense, permitting a multinational to shift U.S. profits
to offshore jurisdictions out of the reach of U.S. tax collectors.114 Earnings stripping
transactions are a significant incentive to invert and gross the largest tax savings
among inversion transactions.115

IV.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO INVERSIONS

It is not illegal to effectively utilize tax laws to lessen tax liabilities owed to the
U.S. government.116 Nevertheless, critics of the practice maintain that inversions
are not within the spirit of the law because the goal is to gain a tax advantage, as tax
104. Id.
105. Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications,
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 338 (2004).
106. Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Through
Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805, 806 (2004) (outlining the pervasiveness of earnings stripping
in inversion transactions).
107. Tootle, supra note 26, at 361.
108. Earnings Stripping Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/earnings-stripping/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
109. Lucar, supra note 8, at 271.
110. Id.
111. Derek E. Anderson, Turning the Corporate Inversion Transaction Right Side Up: Proposed Legislation in the 108th Congress Aims to Stamp Out Any Economic Vitality of the Corporate Inversion
Transaction, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 267, 281-82 (2004).
112. Lucar, supra note 8, at 269.
113. Damian Palleta, Treasury Could Target ‘Earnings Stripping’ in Inversion Hunt, WALL ST. J.:
WASH. WIRE (Aug. 6, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/08/06/treasury-could-target-earnings-stripping-in-inversion-hunt/.
114. Tootle, supra note 26, at 362.
115. Seida & Wempe, supra note 106, at 805 (analyzing the impact of earnings stripping transactions
on four corporations that completed inversions in 2002).
116. Wong, supra note 3, at 455.
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inversions were expected to reduce government revenue by over $2.2 billion in
2015.117 Furthermore, according to a Congressional Budget Office report, inversions were expected to cost the U.S. Treasury $19.5 billion in lost tax revenue over
the next decade.118
Based on the above figures, the Treasury Department has taken the position
that “there is no policy reason to permit a domestic entity to engage in an inversion
transaction when its owners retain a controlling interest in the resulting entity, only
minimal operational changes are expected, and there is significant potential for substantial erosion of the U.S. tax base.”119 The potential loss of government revenue
prompted Congress to introduce more than 30 bills to combat corporate inversion
transactions in the early 2000s.120

A. Government Contracts: Section 835 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Department of Homeland Security was formed in 2002 following the enactment of the Homeland Security Act.121 As part of the Act, Congress was to discourage corporate inversions through the federal procurement process. 122 Section
835 of the Act deters corporate expatriations by preventing the company from acquiring lucrative government contracts.123 Section 835 explicitly provides that
“[t]he Secretary [of Homeland Security] may not enter into any contract with a foreign incorporated entity which is treated as an inverted domestic corporation.”124
By passing the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Congress extended the
contracting prohibition against inverted domestic corporations to other federal
agencies.125 In the succeeding appropriation acts and continuing resolutions, Congress instituted government-wide statutory prohibitions on the use of appropriated
funds to contract with inverted corporations.126
117. Id.
118. Memorandum from Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, to Karen
McAfee, Chief Tax Counsel, House Comm. On Ways and Means (May 23, 2014), available at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/1130927%20JCT%20Revenue%20Estimate.pdf.
119. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1595.
120. Kirsch, supra note 54, at 496.
121. Douglas Chiu, Inversion Subversion: Corporate Inversions and the New Federal Laws Against
Them, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 717, 726 (2015).
122. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 168.
123. Chiu, supra note 121, at 726-27.
124. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2227 (2002)
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 295(a) (2012)).
125. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 168.
126. Prohibition on Contracting with Inverted Domestic Corporations, 80 Fed. Reg. 38309, 38310 (July
2, 2015) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 9 and pt. 52). In FY 2009, the prohibition was continued by §
743 of Division D of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-8, § 743, 123 Stat. 524,
692 (2009); in FY 2010, by § 740 of Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-117, § 740, 123 Stat. 3034, 3215 (2009); in FY 2012, by § 738 of Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 738, 125 Stat. 786, 938 (2012); in FY 2014,
by § 733 of Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 733, 128
Stat. 5237 (2014); and, most recently, for FY 2015, by § 733 of Division E of the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 733, 128 Stat. 2130, 2386
(2014).
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The current ban is a result of the Federal Acquisitions Regulation, which prohibits the use of appropriated funds for contracting with any “foreign incorporated
entity [that] is treated as an inverted domestic corporation . . . or [with] any subsidiary of such an entity,” as defined in 6 U.S.C. § 395(a).127 The statute calls for a
foreign incorporated entity to be treated as an inverted domestic corporation,
[i]f (1) the entity completes . . . the direct or indirect acquisition of substantially all of the properties [of a] domestic corporation; (2) after the acquisition, at least 80% of the stock . . . of the entity . . . is held . . . by former
shareholders of a domestic corporation; and (3) . . . the entity does not have
the substantial business activities in the foreign country in which [it is now
incorporated].128
This statute will be discussed further in the following section.
Despite these Congressional attempts at preventing inversions, inverted companies continue to receive federal government contracts. 129 Many companies have
effectively taken advantage of loopholes in order to procure federal contracts by
claiming in private legal briefs that their company has not met the standard to be
characterized as an inverted domestic corporation.130 These loopholes run the gamut
from military exchanges that do not receive appropriated funds, to maintaining
equipment on military bases, or even winning contracts during periods of temporary
lapses in the ban.131 A 2014 study found that over 12 former U.S. corporations that
inverted “collect[ed] more than $1 billion a year” procured from the U.S. Treasury
in the form of federal contracts.132

B. The American Jobs Creation Act and Section 7874
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2002 (“AJCA”) amended nearly 600 code
sections, which made it the largest revision since the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 133 The
AJCA added § 7874, the most formidable barrier to inversion transactions, to the
Internal Revenue Code after Congress had become aware that a number of multinational businesses with U.S. parent entities inverted to a corporate structure with foreign ownership.134 The law includes provisions to punish inversions by levying tax
penalties on corporations that undergo such transactions.135
Section 7874 only applies to corporate inversions if a certain percentage of former shareholders of the U.S. company own stock in the foreign parent company, or
the “surrogate foreign corporation” in the statute’s language.136 A corporation is a
127. 6 U.S.C. § 395(a) (2012).
128. Id.
129. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 169.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 171.
132. Zachary R. Mider, Ingersoll-Rand Cleared for U.S. Contracts Despite Inversion, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 22, 2014, 8:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-22/ingersoll-rand-cleared-forfederal-contracts-despite-inversion.html.
133. Kim, supra note 28, at 163.
134. Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions Under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: Flawed
Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 699, 700 (2010).
135. Kim, supra note 28, at 164.
136. Tootle, supra note 26, at 368.
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“surrogate foreign corporation” if: (1) it “directly or indirectly acquires substantially all the properties of a domestic corporation,” and (2) post-transaction is at
least 60% of the foreign corporation’s stock as a result of its equity in the domestic
corporation.137 If accountings show that a corporation’s “expanded affiliated group”
138
(“EAG”) has substantial business activities in a foreign country relative to the
total business activities of the foreign group, the entity does not meet the statutory
standard of a “surrogate foreign corporation.”139 “In a[n] inversion transaction, the
foreign parent company is [normally] a surrogate foreign corporation.”140 Section
7874 is applicable if the former shareholders of the U.S. corporation constitute an
ownership rate of at least 60% in the foreign parent undertaking the acquisition.141
In addition, special rules are in place when the former shareholders of the inverted
corporation own 80% of the foreign parent, 142 these rules will be explored below.

1. 60% Inversions
Congress viewed 60% inversion transactions as having a limited tax affect, yet
warranting restriction to guard against the erosion of the U.S. tax base.143 “60%
inversions are likely [the result of] either mergers with established foreign corporations or partial sales to unrelated individuals”—dissimilar from the pure inversions
that prompted public outrage and the enactment of § 7874.144
If, after the inversion transaction, former shareholders of the U.S. operating
corporation own at least 60%, but less than 80% of the foreign parent, then § 7874
considers the foreign corporation to be a “surrogate foreign corporation.”145 This
structure imposes partial tax liability on the U.S. corporation based on a special gain
recognition requirement that limits some taxes of the U.S. corporations for an “applicable period” that applies after the inversion is initiated to ten years after its conclusion.146 The “inversion gain includes any gain on property or stock transferred
to the foreign parent, and any licensing income from that property, without offset
for losses or credits other than the foreign tax credit.” 147
The provision pertaining to inversion gain is a deterrence mechanism, aimed at
preventing corporations with existing losses and credits from undergoing opportunistic inversions.148 Section 7874 achieves this deterrence, regardless of the
137. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B) (2012).
138. Id. § (c)(1) (explaining that an “expanded affiliated group” is defined by § 1504(a), which includes
the foreign corporations, and corporations owned by more than 50% of its voting power or value).
139. Id. § (a)(2)(B)(iii).
140. Tootle, supra note 26, at 369.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 370-71.
143. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 142 (2003) (“The Committee believes that other inversion transactions [involving greater than 50 but less than 80 percent identity of stock ownership] may have sufficient non-tax effect and purpose to be respected, but warrant heightened scrutiny and other restrictions
to ensure that the U.S. tax base is not eroded through related-party transactions.”).
144. Tootle, supra note 26, at 370.
145. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
146. Id. §§ (a)(1), (d)(1).
147. Id. § (d)(2). Losses are ignored because § 7874(a)(1) provides that “[t]he taxable income of an
expatriated entity . . . shall in no event be less than the inversion gain of the entity for the taxable year.”
The application of credits (other than foreign tax credits) is disallowed by § 7874(e)(1). See Tootle, supra
note 26, at 369.
148. Tootle, supra note 26, at 369.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

13

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 11

No. 2]

Thompson; Solving Corporate Inversion

569

corporation’s tax structure, through the nullification of any offset associated with
existing losses and credits that would otherwise be available. 149 The strength of this
deterrence can be determined by observing whether the corporation has operating
losses or credits alternative to those applicable to the foreign tax credit. 150
If the U.S . . . corporation has neither, its inversion gain will not exceed its
taxable income and the provision [is irrelevant;] if the U.S. corporation has
a . . . small amount of losses or credits other than the foreign tax credit, its
inversion gain will [only slightly] exceed its taxable income. 151
In the latter case, the company’s taxable income does not prevent corporations
that engage in a 60% inversion from earning many of their tax benefits through
techniques such as interest allocation or earnings stripping.152

2. 80% Inversions
If former shareholders of the U.S. corporation own 80% or more of the stock
in the new foreign parent following the inversion, the corporation will be exposed
to much harsher tax treatment.153 Section 7874 treats the new foreign parent corporation as a domestic corporation despite its foreign address,154 and any foreignsource income is considered to be domestic income within reach of U.S. tax collectors.155 The classification in § 7874 eliminates the tax benefits associated with an
inversion transaction.156 The multinational corporation will still incur tax liability
under the U.S.’s worldwide tax regime, every potential earnings stripping transaction with the foreign parent will be futile, and the foreign parent will then be within
the jurisdictional reach of the U.S.157

3. Substantial Business Activities
The legislative history underlying the various statutes that codified an overt
hostility toward inversions establishes “that § 7874 was enacted to [dissuade] inversions to tax-haven jurisdictions, where . . . multinational [corporations would]
not have substantial business activities” relative to their global operations.158 Section 7874 contains a “substantial business activities” exemption, where a corporation is not a surrogate foreign corporation if its expanded affiliate group has substantial business activities in the foreign country when compared to the total business activities of the group.159 Attempts of inverting companies to elude § 7874’s
treatment of 80% inversions by qualifying for the substantial business activities
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
Id.; see generally I.R.C. § 7874(d)(1).
Tootle, supra note 26, at 369-70.
I.R.C. § 7874(b).
See VanderWolk, supra note 134, at 704.
Tootle, supra note 26, at 368.
Id. at 370-71.
Id. at 373.
I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii).
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exception is purely financial since the exemption renders § 7874 inapplicable and
permits the corporation to obtain the full tax benefit of the inversion. 160
However, the statute offers no specifics regarding the activities that constitute
substantial business activities.161 Congress delegated the power to interpret substantial business activities to the Treasury through two statutory sources, § 7874(c)(6)
and § 7874(g).162 Section 7874(c)(6) obliges the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe such regulations as may be appropriate to determine [whether] a corporation
is a surrogate foreign corporation.”163 Section 7874(g) compels the Secretary of the
Treasury to “provide such regulations as are necessary to carry out [the] section,
including regulations providing for such adjustments to the application of [the] section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of [the] section.” 164
Under this authority, the Treasury has promulgated numerous regulations, both temporary and permanent, outlining and defining the standard associated with the substantial business activities exception.165

C. Department of the Treasury and other Executive Branch Actions
Despite this legislation, several U.S. corporations have still been able to conduct financially successful inversions.166 Instead of fleeing to traditional offshore
tax havens, companies are now inverting to countries where they have substantial
business activities such as Canada, Ireland, and the U.K.167 Since 2004, the Department of the Treasury has promulgated various regulations instructing the text of §
7874 to be read in a manner that restricts inversions conducted by merging a domestic entity with a foreign corporation.168

1. 2006 Treasury Regulation
In 2006, the Treasury Department promulgated a temporary regulation that interpreted § 7874.169 This regulation clarified the ambiguity of the “substantial business activities” test by setting forth a clear standard.170 To satisfy the “substantial
business activities” standard, the activity must meet either of the following tests:
(1) the “facts-and-circumstances” test, or (2) the safe harbor test. 171
The “facts-and-circumstances” test identifies the existence of substantial business activity related to the worldwide activities of the corporate group.172 The
worldwide activities determination is made on a case-by-case basis, analyzing the
factors and facts of the individual case.173 The “safe harbor test” depends on the
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Tootle, supra note 26, at 371.
Id.
Id. at 377-78.
I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6).
Id. § (g).
Tootle, supra note 26, at 378.
Wong, supra note 3, at 457.
Id.
Id.
T.D. 9265, 2006-2 C.B. 1 [hereinafter T.D. 9265].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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activities of the corporation’s EAG.174 The EAG is the resulting entity after the inversion, which makes up the foreign and domestic corporation.175 The “safe harbor
test” deems a corporation to have substantial business activities automatically if the
foreign corporation accounts for at least 10% of their EAG’s (1) employees, (2)
assets, and (3) sales in a 12-month period.176

2. 2009 and 2012 Treasury Regulations
The IRS and Treasury Department promulgated Treasury Regulation 9453 in
2009.177 Regulation 9453 amended the 2006 Treasury Regulation that attempted to
clarify the “substantial business activities” test. 178 Regulation 9453 removed the
safe harbor test while maintaining the “facts-and-circumstances” test in its original
form.179 Consequently, eliminating the safe harbor test made it much more difficult
to determine what constituted a “substantial” business activity under 7874.180
Following the 2009 regulation, the Treasury Department enacted Treasury
Regulation 9592 in 2012.181 This regulation further amended the 2006 Treasury
Regulation concerning the test for substantial business activity.182 Reversing the
2009 regulation, this regulation removed the “facts-and-circumstances” test and replaced it with a new version of the “safe harbor test.”183 For the purpose of clarity,
the new safe harbor test deems there to be substantial business activity relative to
the total business activities of the corporation group worldwide only if the foreign
corporation accounts for at least 25% of both the foreign and domestic corporations
in: (1) employees, (2) assets, and (3) sales in a 12-month period.184

3. 2014 Treasury Notice
In 2014, the Treasury Department issued an official Treasury Notice aimed at
the second prong of § 7874, which concerns ownership and control.185 For ownership to be under 60% in the foreign corporation and 80% in the newly created entity,
which protects U.S. corporations from tax liability under § 7874, corporations must
either dilute their domestic control or inflate the total foreign ownership. 186
Section 2.02 of the regulation is characterized as an anti-dumping provision.
This characterization is derived from its operational effect, which is to prevent U.S.
corporations from paying out non-ordinary or “extraordinary dividends,” thereby
diluting domestic ownership, in the period preceding the inversion. 187 Moreover,
“[a] dividend is considered non-ordinary if it is 110% greater than the average from
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T(d)(1) (2006).
I.R.C. § 1504(a) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.199-7(a) (2017).
T.D. 9265, supra note 169.
T.D. 9453, 2009-28 I.R.B. 114.
Wong, supra note 3, at 459.
Id.
VanderWolk, supra note 134, at 713.
Wong, supra note 3, at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I.R.S. Notice 2014-5, 2014-2 I.R.B. 276; see also Wong, supra note 3, at 460.
Wong, supra note 3, at 460-61.
Id. at 461.
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the year before”; this is also known as a “skinny-down” dividend.188 If a domestic
corporation’s dividend payout is within three years of the inversion, § 2.02 omits
these dispersals that attempt to dilute the domestic corporation’s size. 189
Section 2.01 of the regulation is an anti-inflation provision that prevents U.S.
corporations from inflating the ownership in the foreign corporation by incorporating specified “passive assets,” resulting in a smaller ownership percentage. 190 Assets that are not part of a corporation’s daily business operations are designated as
passive assets.191 Examples of passive assets include “cash, cash equivalents, or
marketable securities.”192 Section 2.01 will disregard a segment of a foreign corporation’s passive assets, whose purpose is to artificially inflate the foreign corporation’s size, if those assets constitute at a minimum of 50% of the entity’s total assets.193
Additionally, the Treasury Notice disincentivizes U.S. corporations from inverting by eliminating post-inversion outlets access to foreign earnings without being subject to repatriation taxes.194 Before the promulgation of the 2014 Treasury
Notice, U.S. corporations used inversions to take advantage of deferred earnings by
employing maneuvers, which were allowed by the tax code, where the entity would
leave income earned by the foreign corporation abroad, thereby beyond the reach
of U.S. tax authorities.195 “The 2014 . . . Notice prevents three tactics . . . U.S. corporations [commonly] use to access foreign income [while] avoid[ing] repatriation.”196 “First, the [Notice] closed the loophole to ‘hopscotch’ loans . . . by treating
[these] loans as U.S. property subject to [a] tax for a ten-year period following the
date of the inversion.”197 A “hopscotch” loan enables the controlled foreign corporation to fund the acquisition by loaning cash to the targeted corporation—skipping
the domestic corporation.198
Second, the Notice endeavors to close the loophole for “decontrolling” transactions whereby the EAG and controlled foreign corporation conduct a “stock-asset
swap.”199 Following the swap, the EAG owns 50% or more of the controlled foreign
corporation’s stock, making the controlled foreign corporation a foreign subsidiary
of the EAG.200 The Notice prevents U.S. corporations from evading repatriation by
recognizing the subsidiary in these transactions as a controlled foreign corporation
if it occurs within ten years of the inversion date.201 Third, the Notice completely
precludes a “spinversion” whereby the domestic corporation “spins off a portion of
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 461-62.
194. See Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax
Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 9 (2014), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2329&context=key_workplace.
195. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-52 I.R.B. 172; see also Wong, supra note 3 at 462.
196. Wong, supra note 3, at 462.
197. Id. at 462-63.
198. Id. at 463.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See BakerHostetler, U.S. Treasury Department Takes Action to Slow (But Not Stop) Corporate
Inversions: A Summary for Executives, JDSUPRA (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/us-treasury-department-takes-action-to-94236/.
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its business or assets into a separate . . . subsidiary.” 202 A foreign corporation then
acquires the subsidiary by giving the shareholders stock in the foreign corporation
that is subject to lower tax rates in the foreign country.203 The Notice eliminates any
incentives and resulting tax benefits by classifying the spin-off company as a domestic corporation.204

4. 2016 Treasury Regulations
The most recent regulations announced by the Department of the Treasury are
intended to reduce companies’ incentive to avoid paying taxes through earnings
stripping.205 The main thrust of the new regulations is to “limit inversions by disregarding foreign parent stock attributable to [certain prior] inversions or acquisitions
of U.S. companies.”206 It is inconsistent with the intent of § 7874 to permit a foreign
company to increase its size “to avoid the current inversion threshold for a subsequent . . . acquisition” of a U.S. entity.207 The 2016 regulation limits this practice
by utilizing an inventive methodology for determining whether the post-acquisition
ownership percentage indicates the transaction should be treated as an inversion. 208
The method determines ownership percentage by “exclude[ing the] stock of the foreign company attributable to assets acquired from [a U.S. entity] within three years
prior to the signing date of the latest acquisition.”209
In addition to the limits imposed above, this regulation also addresses earnings
stripping by “targeting transactions that increase [the] related-party debt that does
not finance new investment[s]” in the U.S. under § 385.210 The regulation makes it
more difficult for foreign-parented groups to allocate related-party debt swiftly to
their U.S. subsidiaries “following an inversion or foreign takeover, by treating as
stock the instruments issued to a related corporation in a dividend or a limited class
of economically similar transactions.” 211 The regulation:
(1) treat[s] as stock an instrument that might otherwise be considered debt
if it is issued by a subsidiary to its foreign parent in a shareholder dividend
distribution; (2) addresses a “two-step” version of a dividend distribution
of debt in which a U.S. subsidiary (i) borrows cash from a related company, and (ii) pays a cash dividend distribution to its foreign parent; and
(3) treat[s] as stock an instrument that might otherwise be considered debt
if it is issued in connection with certain acquisitions of stock or assets from
202. Wong, supra note 3, at 463.
203. Id. at 463-64.
204. John C. Hamlett, The Declining Allure of Being “American” and the Proliferation of Corporate
Tax Inversions: A Critical Analysis of Regulatory Efforts to Curtail the Inversion Trend, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 767, 790 (2016).
205. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Additional Act to Curb Inversions,
Address Earnings Stripping (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0405.aspx.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion Regulations and
Proposed Earnings Stripping Regulations (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl0404.aspx.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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related corporations in transactions that are economically similar to a dividend distribution.212
Another aspect of this regulation issued under § 385 permits the IRS on audit
to divide a purported debt instrument into part debt and part stock.213 This proposed
regulation implements “statutory authority to treat an instrument issued to a related
party as in part debt and in part equity to eliminate distortions” under the current
law that treats instruments as either entirely debt or entirely equity. 214 Finally, the
new regulations require “documentation for members of large corporate groups to
include key information for a debt-equity tax analysis.” 215 This action requires companies to “undertake certain due diligence and complete documentation up front to
establish that a financial instrument is really debt.”216 Specifically, companies are
required to document key information, “including a binding obligation for the issuer
to repay the principal amount borrowed, creditor’s rights, a reasonable expectation
of repayment, and evidence of ongoing debtor-creditor relationship.”217 “If these
requirements are not met, instruments will be characterized as equity for tax purposes.”218
Finally, the 2016 regulations formalize two previous actions that the Treasury
Department took to curb inversions.219 One addresses a technique that U.S. companies use to avoid § 7874 “by structuring an inversion as a multi-step transaction
using back-to-back foreign acquisitions.”220 The other “requires a foreign subsidiary of the inverted U.S. [corporate] group to recognize all realized gain upon certain
post-inversion asset transfers that dilute the inverted U.S. group’s ownership of
those assets.”221

V.

PROPOSALS

While politicians in the United States may describe companies that invert as
unpatriotic or deserters,222 corporate officers and boards of directors have a duty of
loyalty to the shareholders, which is independent of national loyalty. 223 As stated
above, the directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty essentially imposes an obligation to
maximize profitability and stock value.224 A report published by the University of
Chicago found that for inversions that took place in the two decades between 1993

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Brian Faler, Obama Blasts ‘Corporate Deserters’, POLITICO (July 24, 2014, 6:29 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obama-corporate-deserters-taxes-109357.html (reporting that
President Obama and other lawmakers consider those companies who invert to be “deserters”).
223. Harv. Ass’n, supra note 97, at 2279.
224. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 167.
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and 2013, companies outperformed the market average in the subsequent years.225
Given these results and the reality of global competition, corporate directors will
have difficulty continuing as a U.S. domicile when an inversion into a foreign jurisdiction could produce millions in savings, which increases shareholder value. 226
In order to achieve these results without completely eroding the tax base, the U.S.
government has the burden and obligation to create a more business-friendly environment.227 The proposals below will do exactly that.

A. Replace the Worldwide Tax Scheme with a Territorial Tax System
Advocates of the U.S. worldwide tax system cite a benefits theory to justify an
anticompetitive tax structure.228 The premise of the benefits theory is that favorable
and predictably enforced property and contract laws, combined with advanced public infrastructure, can validate the U.S. system—despite the fact it undeniably results in greater tax liability for domestic corporations.229 Additionally, proponents
claim a worldwide tax structure creates an environment where it is advantageous
for domestic businesses to keep their active investments in the U.S. instead of shifting them abroad.230
Despite these alleged benefits, Congress’s right to tax profits earned outside
the U.S. is one of the primary reasons for the U.S. corporate exodus. 231 U.S. multinational corporations are operating at an existing and overt competitive disadvantage as a result of the worldwide system since it allows U.S. tax collectors to
reach profits earned offshore.232 Far from incentivizing investments, by punishing
domestic incorporation, these costs and taxes actually induce entities to incorporate
abroad.233 In addition, the worldwide system reduces the dividends that a U.S. company can distribute to its investors because the entity cannot repatriate the foreign
earnings without domestic tax liability. 234 Lastly, the current tax structure restricts
investment of “productive capital” back into the U.S. 235 Following an inversion,
however, the corporation foregoes all tax liability, enabling the entity to invest foreign earnings into U.S. operations without being subject to additional U.S. taxes.236
To keep American businesses competitive, congressional inaction is no longer
an option. Although the majority of OECD countries have already adopted a territorial system, which taxes only domestically earned corporate income, it is not too
late for Congress to follow suit.237 The switch to a territorial system has the potential
225. Brooke Sutherland, Investors Cheer, U.S. Jeers at Tax-Driven Deals: Real M&A, BLOOMBERG
(June 17, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-16/investors-cheer-u-sjeers-at-tax-driven-deals-real-m-a.
226. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1361-62.
227. Id. at 1361.
228. Hamlett, supra note 204, at 771.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 179.
232. Id.
233. See John Richardson, Guest Post: Inversions, Planning & Corporate Tax Rates, FORBES (Oct. 8,
2014, 7:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/10/08/guest-post-inversions-planning-corporate-tax-rates/#b3de2782c48a.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 179.
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to create more jobs and higher wages as a result of U.S. businesses increasing domestic investment.238 Research has illuminated evidence of actual benefits when
U.S. businesses are able to expand and invest overseas without the threat of additional taxes.239 More specifically, domestic investment increases 2.6% for every
10% increase U.S. foreign investments.240 Domestic investment is required to support prospective foreign investments and typically results in the creation of new
domestic jobs.241 Thus, the adoption of a territorial system would reduce the inversion incentive because the system encourages a multi-layer domestic and global
investment strategy that can cause domestic job creation and an increase in domestic
wages.242

B. Lower Corporate Tax Rates
Lowering the corporate tax rates in the U.S. would assist in eliminating the
incentive for U.S. multinational corporations to invert, while also helping to create
an environment where these entities are able to generate revenue comparable to
foreign multinationals without having to invert. 243 Within the field of economics,
there is a general consensus that a broad tax base with low rates is more advantageous than a narrow tax base with high rates.244 As evidence, the U.S. corporate tax
rate of 35%, the highest among OECD nations,245 generated approximately “half as
much revenue . . . as the average OECD” country applying a corporate tax rate of
approximately 29%.246 Lowering the corporate tax rate will broaden the tax base,
eliminate incentives to expatriate, induce multinational corporations to incorporate
in the U.S., and benefit the U.S. corporate tax base going forward.247
If Congress is able to enact a lower corporate tax rate, the U.S. will align itself
with other OECD rates, which will result in greater global competition. 248 U.S. multinationals will only invert if it will result in positive returns. 249 If the cost of inverting exceeds the benefit, corporate inversions by multinationals will violate obligations to shareholders of maximizing profits.250 Decreasing the tax rate eliminates
238. Curtis Dubay, A Territorial Tax System Would Create Jobs and Raise Wages for U.S. Workers,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/a-territorial-taxsystem-would-create-jobs-and-raise-wages-for-us-workers.
239. Mihir A. Desai et al., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of U.S. Multinationals, 1 AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 181, 181-82 (2009).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 201.
242. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 181.
243. Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of the Corporate Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.
J. 89, 103 (2012).
244. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Role of U.S. Tax Policy in Offshoring, CITESEERX 1, 29 (June 2005),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.128.8648&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
245. Kyle Pomerleau & Andrew Lundeen, The U.S Has the Highest Corporate Income Tax Rate in the
OECD, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2014), https://taxfoundation.org/us-has-highest-corporate-income-taxrate-oecd.
246. Clausing, supra note 244, at 19.
247. Dumler, supra note 243, at 104.
248. Id.
249. Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S-Based Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the Cause
for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 560-61
(2003).
250. Id.
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the reason to invert because of the limited benefits of tax revenue savings.251 Therefore, there will be less incentive to expatriate because the decrease in the mechanism’s appeal is correlated to the decrease in the corporate tax rate. 252

1.

Case Study: The United Kingdom

To illustrate the impact of these proposals, in 2009, the U.K. began enacting a
series of reforms that resulted in the reincorporation of multinational companies and
the growth of the Commonwealth’s corporate tax base.253 Two key reforms were
aimed at stopping the inversion problem and creating a more attractive business
environment: (1) reducing the corporate tax rate, and (2) moving to a territorial tax
system.254 The corporate tax reform reduced the corporate tax rate from 30% in
2009 to its present rate of 20%.255
The results are staggering. U.S. corporations, such as Liberty Global, Rowan,
Aon, and Ensco have reincorporated in the U.K. 256 A 2013 Ernst & Young report
found “approximately 60 multinational companies were considering relocating . . .
a regional [or global] headquarters to the U.K.” due to the reduction in tax rates. 257
Furthermore, the move to a territorial tax scheme increased the competitiveness of
corporations in the U.K. regarding international mergers and acquisitions. 258 These
reforms have also effectuated growth because U.K. corporations are growing by
approximately 80% per year and are projected to surpass the total number of U.S.
corporations by 2017.259
Even more important from the standpoint of a government hesitant in enacting
reforms, the U.K has consistently raised more corporate tax revenue than the U.S.
when measured as a share of gross domestic product.260 These reforms have also
produced a more stable economy: following the financial crisis in 2008, U.K. corporate tax revenue was less affected, averaging 3% of GDP while the U.S. revenue
averaged 2.2%.261 Furthermore, “[t]he U.K. now collects more revenue from nonfinancial corporations than the U.S. does from all corporations.”262

251. Dumler, supra note 243, at 106.
252. Id. at 104-06.
253. William McBride, Tax Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions, TAX
FOUND. 1, 4-6 (Oct. 14, 2014), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF442.pdf.
254. Id. at 4.
255. Id. at 3-4.
256. Id. at 5.
257. James Quinn, EY: Cutting UK Tax Draws in More Multinationals, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 25, 2013,
11:13 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10472446/EY-CuttingUK-tax-draws-in-more-multinationals.html.
258. Lars P. Feld et al., Effects of Territorial and Worldwide Corporate Tax Systems on Outboard
M&As, CTR. FOR EUR. ECON. RES. 1, 2 (July 7, 2013), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13088.pdf;
see also McBride, supra note 253 at 6 (attributing this statistic directly to the anticompetitive U.S. Tax
Code).
259. McBride, supra note 253 at 5-6.
260. Id. at 6.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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2. Case Study: Canada
Actions taken by the Canadian government offers great insight into the benefits
of a lower corporate tax rate. Since 2000, Canada has incrementally lowered its
corporate tax rate from 43% to 26%.263 As the corporate tax rate has gradually decreased, Canada’s corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP has progressively increased,264 averaging 3.3% as rates began to decline in 2000, compared to 2.6%
over the preceding 12 years.265 Even more convincing, compared to the total corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP of the U.S., Canada has experienced 1%
greater overall revenue.266 During this time, Canada’s revenue share has averaged
3.3%, while the U.S. has averaged only 2.3%.267
Firms are taking notice that Canada is open for business. For instance, companies such as accounting powerhouse KPMG, Spectra Energy Corp., and Tim Hortons (who left Canada after being acquired by Wendy’s International, Inc. in 1995)
have all moved back to Canada.268 Beyond these specific companies, the financial
services industry began entering the Canadian market, bringing with it a large inflow of capital, to benefit from the obvious advantages of this business friendly
environment.269 Canada is the perfect example of how a reduction in the corporate
tax rate, which as demonstrated can actually increase tax revenue, at a minimum
neutralizes any alleged loss in tax revenue by encouraging and stimulating economic activity.270

C. Changing the Definition of Corporate Tax Residence
There are two primary tests for locating a corporation: (1) “the ‘place of incorporation’ (“POI”) rule, or [(2)] a version of the ‘real seat’ rule.”271 The U.S. uses
the POI test,272 an advantage of which is that it requires no interpretation.273 The
POI standard “lower[s] compliance costs, avoid[s] litigation risks, and can be easily
administered, especially in cases that involve a complex chain of related corporations.”274 U.S. corporations have the option to invert due to the U.S.’s adherence to
the POI system, which inverting companies avoid by incorporating in a foreign jurisdiction.275 The U.S. should adopt a residence test that employs two criteria for
263. William McBride, Canada’s Lower Corporate Tax Rate Raises More Tax Revenue, TAX FOUND.
(Aug. 27, 2014), https://taxfoundation.org/canadas-lower-corporate-tax-rate-raises-more-tax-revenue/.
264. David Khanjyan, Comment, Demanding Corporate Patriotism: A Regulatory Attempt to Curb
International Corporate Inversions and Stop Tax Avoidance Schemes, 9 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
L. 129, 146 (2015).
265. McBride, supra note 263.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Khanjyan, supra note 264, at 147.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1235 (2008).
272. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2014).
273. Kara Baquizal, The Challenges of Redefining Corporate Tax Residence in a Competitive Global
Market, FED. BAR 1, 7 (2012), http://www.fedbar.org/image-library/sections-and-divisions/tax/2012taxlawcomp-1st.pdf.
274. Id.
275. Omri Mariam, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1629 (2013).
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determining a corporate domicile for the purpose of federal income tax. Under this
test, the corporation will be treated as “domestic” if the corporation is “(1) managed
and controlled from the U.S.; or (2) the securities of which are listed on a [stock]
exchange in the U.S.”276 One benefit a standard set by a “management and control”
test is that it presents more insight and transparency into the operational structure
of the corporation and its actual “resident” status.277 Even more important, such a
system would make the process more burdensome, which in turn would reduce the
incentive to participate.278
The U.K. uses a “substantive connection between the country and the taxpayer”
in order to define “management and control” by looking to the board of directors,
to determine “where high level decision-making occurs.”279 Additionally, in 1988,
the U.K. set a criteria for companies incorporated in the Commonwealth that based
the status of a corporation on its place of formal incorporation.280 Some civil law
jurisdictions, most notably Sweden and Italy, use a multitude of factors such as the
“[entity’s] place of incorporation, place of legal registry, or the location of the taxpayer’s legal office location or headquarters” to determine corporate status. 281 In
Asia, Japan being the third largest economy in the world,282 uses the corporation’s
headquarters to determine its domicile.283 Importantly, “[m]ost other countries,
[namely] Germany and the Netherlands, [use] a combination of these methods.”284

VI.

CONCLUSION

Corporate inversions have undoubtedly proven to be a difficult phenomenon to
prevent. Throughout all attempts to curb the amount of inversions over the years,
one truism has emerged: the executive branch cannot solve this problem alone. The
solution to the inversion phenomenon lies in a comprehensive reformation of our
tax structure and code. There has been a movement toward reformation. President
Donald J. Trump recently said to a group of CEOs, “[w]e’re trying to get it [corporate tax rate] down to anywhere from fifteen to twenty percent.”285 This proposal
has broad congressional support among republicans, including Speaker of the
House Paul Ryan, whose “A Better Way” agenda has proposed a flat 20% corporate
tax rate.286

276. Id. at 1664.
277. Baquizal, supra note 273, at 7.
278. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1619.
279. De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v. Howe [1906] AC 455 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also
Baquizal, supra note 273, at 8, 25.
280. Baquizal, supra note 273, at 8; see also HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE
INCOME TAXATION 434-35 (3d ed. 2010).
281. Baquizal, supra note 273, at 8.
282. Gross Domestic Product 2016, WORLDBANK (Apr. 17, 2017), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
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285. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Trump’s Take on Corporate Tax Rate Could Look Very Much Like Obama’s,
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286. Pete Sapp, The Way Forward on Tax Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 27, 2017, 12:30
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These proposals are a step in the right direction. However, the President and
Congress should not stop there. Lowering the corporate tax rate will produce results
for America, as shown by the results achieved by Britain and Canada, however, to
win the free market battle, the structure of America’s system of taxation must also
be reformed. Despite a lower tax rate, the worldwide system of taxation will continue to incentivize U.S. multinationals to invert because of the additional burden
imposed that multinationals in other jurisdictions with similar tax rates do not encounter.
There needs to be a complete leveling of the playing field on all fronts. Such a
widespread problem calls for bold action, not just a simple tax cut. The global economy is a competition and America is currently losing. As the former chair and CEO
of Citibank Walter Winston said, “money goes where it is wanted, and stays where
it is well treated.”287 Until the U.S. government institutes these reforms, money will
continue to go where it is wanted and well treated, overseas.

287. Richard Russell, Money Goes Where it is Wanted and Stays Where it is Well-Treated, MONEY
TALKS (Aug. 15, 2009, 1:55 AM), http://moneytalks.net/old-daily-updates/2025-qmoney-goes-whereit-is-wanted-and-stays-where-it-is-well-treatedq.html.
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